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Monetary policy has signi￿cant but overlooked e⁄ects on entry and exit of ￿rms.
We study optimal monetary stabilization policy in a DSGE model with microfounded
money demand and endogenous ￿rm entry. Due to a congestion externality a⁄ecting
￿rm entry, the optimal policy deviates from the Friedman rule in all states even though
all prices are fully ￿ exible. In contrast to previous Ramsey model with ￿ exible price,
our calibration exercises suggest that the model can generate a high volatility of the
nominal interest rate which is a direct consequence of policy actions to control entry.
￿The paper has bene￿tted from comments by participants at several seminar and conference presentations
in particular Sanjay Chugh, Allen Head and Huberto Ennis. We thank the Federal Reserve Banks of
Cleveland, Minneapolis and St. Louis, CES in Munich and the Kellogg Institute at the University of Notre
Dame for research support.
11 Introduction
There is a rapidly growing macroeconomic literature that investigates the role of endogenous
￿rm entry and exit on business cycle ￿ uctuations.1 Studying entry behavior in a macroecon-
omy is important for several reasons. First, a key business cycle fact, as shown by Bilbiie,
Ghironi and Melitz (2006), is that net ￿rm entry is strongly procyclical and leads GDP.2
Second, entry creates an extensive output margin that can amplify and propagate aggregate
shocks. Moreover, as recently demonstrated by Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008), the ampli-
￿cation e⁄ects of shocks via entry are quantitatively important. Third, using a monetary
VAR Bergin and Corsetti (2008) document that monetary policy has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on
￿rm entry.
Based on this line of reasoning, ￿rm entry may be an important factor for monetary
policy. This is not just a theoretical concern. For example, the recent housing bubble in the
U.S. is widely believed to have been associated with an excessive amount of new construction
of houses and retail development suggesting that there was too much entry from a social point
of view. As a result, many economists believe that the Federal Reserve should have raised
the nominal interest rate to deter entry of builders and developers into the housing and
commercial property markets.
The notion that there was ￿too much entry from a social point of view￿suggests that
there are entry externalities that individual ￿rms to not take into account with their entry
or exit decisions. The main contribution of this paper is to study optimal monetary stabi-
lization policy in a DSGE model, when entry creates ￿ congestion￿that a⁄ects the trading
opportunities for other ￿rms. This externality causes aggregate output to be ine¢ cient and
monetary policy is designed to move output closer to the ￿rst-best allocation. Changes in
aggregate output can be achieved via the intensive margin (output per producer) or the
extensive margin (entry and exit of producers). At ￿rst glance, one may think it is irrelevant
which margin is used but this is not the case. Suppose the central bank wants output to
expand. If producers have convex costs of production, then it would be optimal to increase
the number of producers to lower the marginal cost of producing this additional output.
The basic framework is that of Lagos and Wright (2005) where informational frictions
1See Jaimovich (2006, 2007), Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008), Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2006, 2007),
Bergin and Corsetti (2008), Kim (2006), Mancini-Gri⁄oli and Elkhoury (2006), Lewis (2008a, 2008b) and
Fujiwara (2007). Earlier works on this topic include Chatterjee and Cooper (1993) and Devereaux, Head
and Lapham (1996).
2They ￿nd that the correlation between net ￿rm entry at time t and quarterly real GDP at t+1 is
approximately 0.5 using HP ￿ltered data. Using a VAR approach, Bergin and Corsetti (2008) ￿nd that
the correlation is between 0.53 and 0.73. Using simple detrending methods, Chatterjee and Cooper (1993)
estimate it at 0.5.
2make money essential as a medium of exchange.3 We then modify the model in several
ways. First, we assume that producers make an entry decision that requires paying a fee
every period. Second, we carefully model the existence of a credit market that allows agents
to borrow and lend money. Third, we introduce a variety of well-de￿ned shocks, such as
productivity and preference shocks, that generate consumption risk for households. Due to
the informational frictions that give rise to money, households are unable to perfectly insure
themselves against these shocks. This gives rise to a welfare improving role for monetary
policy that works by adjusting the nominal interest rate in response to shocks. Optimal
policy is determined by choosing a set of state-contingent nominal interest rates to maximize
the expected lifetime utility of the agents subject to the constraints of being an equilibrium.
Finally, we consider three pricing protocols ￿competitive pricing, monopoly pricing and price
posting ￿in the market where money is essential as a medium of exchange. This allows us to
see how optimal monetary policy changes as a result of the di⁄erent pricing mechanisms. An
important feature of our model is that there is a role for stabilization policy in the absence
of sticky prices.
Borrowing from Rocheteau and Wright (2005), we assume that upon entering the market,
a producer is able to trade with some probability, which may not be one. In short, he may
be shut out of the market despite having paid the entry cost. We then study optimal
stabilization under two assumptions regarding this trading probability. In one case, we
assume that this trading probability is independent of the number of producers in the market.
In the second case, we assume that the probability of trading is decreasing in the number
of entering producers. This is intended to capture the idea that as more producers enter
congestion occurs making it harder to trade and earn pro￿ts.4
Our basic results concerning the optimal stabilization policy are as follows. With a ￿xed
probability of trading, the optimal monetary policy is to run the Friedman rule and set the
nominal interest rate to zero in all states. This is true for all three pricing protocols. When
the trading probability depends on aggregate entry, a congestion externality arises that makes
entry ine¢ ciently high. Thus, the central bank ￿nds it optimal to raise interest rates above
zero in all states in order to reduce entry even though it lowers average consumption. Once
again, this is true for all pricing protocols. In short, the zero lower bound is never a binding
3Most stabilization policy analysis has been done using the canonical New Keynesian model, which has
sticky prices. In these models, in the absence of nominal rigidities, monetary policy is ine⁄ective since money
is neutral. An important contribution of this paper is to show that the informational frictions that give rise
to a medium of exchange role for money allow for a welfare improving role of stabilisation policy even when
all prices are fully ￿ exible.
4This type of matching externality is common in monetary search models. Examples include Shi (1997),
Lagos and Rocheteau (2005), Aruoba, Rocheteau and Waller (2007) and Berentsen, Rocheteau and Shi
(2007).
3constraint in our model. The key to implementing the desired allocation is to manipulate the
relative price of goods across markets by choosing state-dependent nominal interest rates.
A ￿nal issue that we address with our model is the volatility of the nominal interest rate.
The reason for this is as follows. In Ramsey models of the type studied by Chari and Kehoe
(1999), for certain preferences, the Friedman rule is optimal for all shocks, so the volatility
is zero. Aruoba and Chugh (2007) have shown that even if the Friedman rule is not optimal,
the volatility of the nominal interest under the optimal policy is still very small. In contrast,
New Keynesian models tend to have the nominal interest rate being too volatile compared
to the data. For example, Khan, King and Wolman (2003) show that the optimal policy
requires a very volatile interest rate. They explain this ￿nding that with sticky prices the
relative price distortion is minimized by setting the expected in￿ ation rate to zero. This
leads the optimal nominal interest rate to track the real interest rate which moves with the
aggregate shocks. This has led New Keynesian to add a lagged interest rate into the Taylor
rule to induce interest rate smoothing.
This dramatic contrast as to how the nominal interest rate should respond to shocks
suggests we quantify the volatility of the nominal interest rate in our model as well. In
particular, since none of the aforementioned models have entry, it is interesting to know how
endogenous entry a⁄ects the volatility of the nominal interest rate. Towards this end, we
calibrate our model to study the volatility of the nominal interest rate. The key quantitative
question we address is the following: If the shock processes in our model are constructed
to match the actual behavior of GDP, how does the optimal nominal interest rate behave
in our model compared to the data? We ￿nd the following. If the shocks are ￿ demand
side￿in nature (i.e., preference shocks), then our model generates very little volatility of
the nominal interest rate. Alternatively, if productivity shocks are the only shock, then our
model generates a volatility of the interest rate that is larger than in the data. These results
suggest the following. First, congestion externalities provide a propagation mechanism for
productivity shocks to induce substantial interest rate volatility in Ramsey models. Second,
a combination of supply and demand shocks are needed to generate the volatility of the
nominal interest rate observed in the data.
Our framework for studying stabilization is substantially di⁄erent than the existing liter-
ature on endogenous entry. Jaimovich and Floetotto (2007) use a prototypical real business
cycle, hence there is no role for monetary policy. All of the others papers in this area are
based on New Keynesian sticky price models while our basic framework displays fully ￿ exible
prices. Nevertheless, we show that money is non-neutral and that there is a role for stabiliza-
tion policy. Furthermore, many of the papers simply look at the e⁄ects of monetary shocks
￿they do not study optimal monetary policy. Of those that do study optimal policy, Bergin
4and Corsetti (2008) and Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2007) do so for a simple class of inter-
est rate rules with a single productivity shock. Bergin and Corsetti (2008) consider a model
where entry enlarges the set of goods available to households. The households have a love
for variety, so that enlarging the set of goods can have a positive externality on household
utility. As mentioned above, we di⁄er from their approach in several dimensions. However,
the most important di⁄erence is that our entry congestion imposes a negative externality
on other market participants. As such, our model captures episodes where there was ￿too
much entry from a social point of view￿as suggested by many observers of the recent events
in the housing and commercial property markets. Finally, Lewis￿ s (2008b) is also closely
related to our work in that she derives the optimal monetary policy using a primal Ramsey
approach in a cash-in-advance model. She ￿nds that the Friedman rule is optimal, hence
there is no stabilization role for monetary policy. Also, there is also no quantitative analysis
in her work. Finally, we address other issues, such as the zero lower nominal bound on
interest rates, that these papers do not. We have also studied optimal stabilization in an
earlier paper, Berentsen and Waller (2008), but the focus of that paper was the use of price
level targeting as a monetary policy strategy to control in￿ ation expectations. Furthermore,
we did not study endogenous entry, di⁄erent pricing protocols or conduct any quantitative
analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the environment and derive
the ￿rst-best allocation. In Section 3 we present the agents￿decision problems. Section 4
contains the central bank￿ s maximization problem and the optimal monetary policy for each
pricing protocol. Section 5 contains our quantitative analysis and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever.5 In each period three perfectly competitive markets
open sequentially. The ￿rst market is a competitive credit market and the third market is a
competitive goods markets. The second market is also a goods market for which we study
various market structures. There is a continuum of two types of agents, called households
and sellers. They di⁄er in terms of when they produce and consume as follows. All agents
can produce and consume a perishable good in the last market. In the second market
households can consume but not produce and sellers can produce but not consume. We
5The environment combines elements of Lagos and Wright (2005) and Berentsen, Camera and Waller
(2007). The Lagos-Wright framework provides a microfoundation for money demand while keeping the dis-
tribution of money balances analytically tractable. Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007) introduce ￿nancial
intermediation into the Lagos-Wright framework.
5assume that all trades in the second market are anonymous ruling out trade credit. Since all
agents are anonymous and there is a double coincidence problem, sellers require immediate
compensation. So households must pay with money in market 2 generating an essential role
for money.
The instantaneous utility of a household at date t is
U
b
t = ￿(xt) ￿ yt +  tu(q
b
t) (1)
where xt is consumption and yt production in the last market.6 The quantity qb
t is a house-
hold￿ s consumption in the second market and   ￿ 0 is a preference parameter. We assume
u0 > 0, u00 < 0, u0(0) = +1 and u0(1) = 0. Furthermore, we assume the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion, Ru ￿ ￿qu00=u0, is constant and less than one.7 In the last market the
utility function satis￿es ￿0 > 0, ￿00 < 0, ￿0(0) = 1 and there is a x￿ such that ￿0(x￿) = 1.
The instantaneous utility of a seller at date t is
U
s
t = ￿(xt) ￿ yt ￿ (1=￿t)c(qt) (2)
where xt is consumption and yt is production in the last market while qt is production in the
second market. Production disutility satis￿es c0; c00;c000 ￿ 0 and c(0) = c0 (0) = 0. Denote
the elasticity of marginal cost as Rc ￿ qc00=c0. The parameter ￿ is a productivity parameter
measured in utility terms with higher values of ￿ being associated with higher productivity
and thus lower marginal utility costs of production. The discount factor across dates is
￿ = 1=(1 + r) 2 (0;1) where r is the time rate of discount.
2.1 Credit market
At the beginning of a period all households receive a preference shock  t 2 f0;"g with " > 0.
The probability that  t = " is 1=2 meaning there is an equal probability that a household
wants to consume or not in market 2.8 We call households that consume buyers and those
that do not non-buyers. These preference shocks generate an ex-post ine¢ ciency since non-
buyers are holding idle balances while buyers are cash constrained. As in Berentsen, Camera
and Waller (2007) this ine¢ ciency generates a welfare improving role for a credit market
6As in Lagos and Wright (2005), these assumptions allow us to get a degenerate distribution of money
holdings at the beginning of a period. The di⁄erent utility functions ￿ (￿)and u(￿) allow us to impose technical
conditions such that in equilibrium all agents produce and consume in the last market.
7This restriction on preferences is not necessary for competitive pricing but is needed for interior solutions
under monopolistic pricing.
8We have also allowed this number to be di⁄erent than 1=2 and to make it random. However, it added
very little to the analytical and quantitative results. Thus we chose 1=2 to simplify notation.
6where households can borrow or lend money at the nominal interest rate i.
Whereas goods trade is anonymous, we assume the existence of a record-keeping technol-
ogy over ￿nancial transactions, i.e., ￿nancial trading histories are not private information.
In all models with credit, default is a serious issue. To focus on optimal stabilization, we
simplify the analysis by assuming that some mechanism exists that ensures repayment of
loans in the third market.9 One can show that due to the quasi-linearity of preferences in
market 3 there is no gain from multi-period contracts. Furthermore, since the states are
revealed prior to contracting, the one-period nominal debt contracts that we consider are
optimal.
2.2 Shocks
To study the optimal response to shocks, we assume that ￿t and "t are stochastic. The
random variable ￿t has support [￿;￿], 0 < ￿ < ￿ < 1, and "t has support [";"], 0 <
" < " < 1. Let !t = (￿t;"t) 2 ￿ be the state in market 1, where ￿ = [￿;￿] ￿ [";"]
is a closed and compact subset on R
2
+. We allow for the shocks to be serially correlated.
Let ￿t = f!t;!t￿1;:::g denote the history of the aggregate state up through period t. For
notational simplicity let dF (!tj￿t￿1) ￿ dF (￿tj￿t￿1)dF ("tj￿t￿1) denote the conditional
density function of !t where dF (!tj￿t￿1) = f (!tj￿t￿1)d!t. For discussion purposes, we
label "t as a ￿ demand￿shock, while a shock to ￿t is referred to as a ￿ supply￿shock.
2.3 Free entry and search frictions
In order to capture the fact that ￿rm entry and exit ￿ uctuates over the business cycle, we
assume that entry is endogenous and costly for sellers. At the beginning of every period
after observing the shock, sellers have to pay the cost ￿ > 0 in terms of disutility to enter
the second market.10 The set of potential ￿rms is denoted F. Let S ￿ F denote the set
of sellers that pay the utility cost ￿ to enter the second market. We assume that the set
of potential sellers F is so large that S ￿ F. Let s denote the measure of S. The set of
households is denoted by H whose size is normalized to 2. Let B ￿ H denote the set of
households with e = " (the buyers), where b = 1 is the measure of B.
We introduce search frictions along the lines of Rocheteau and Wright (2005) who assume
that not all ￿rms that pay the ￿xed utility cost can trade in market 2. That is, paying ￿
9In Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007) we derive the equilibrium when the only punishment for
strategic default is exclusion from the ￿nancial system in all future periods.
10Assuming a ￿xed utility cost ￿ is standard in the labor search literature (e.g. Pissarides 2000, Rogerson,
Shimer and Wright 2005) or in the money search literature (e.g. Rocheteau and Wright 2005).
7means entry into the group S of ￿rms that try to enter market 2. Only ~ S ￿ S suceed. Denote
￿ (s) the probability of trading in market 2 for a ￿rm that has paid the utility cost. Then,
￿ (s)s is the measure of ~ S. We impose the usual assumptions on ￿ (s), namely ￿0 (s) ￿ 0,
￿00 (s) ￿ 0, ￿ (s) ￿ 1, ￿ (0) = 1, and ￿ (1) = 0.11 Finally, denote ￿￿ ￿ s￿0 (s)=￿ (s) < 0
as the elasticity of ￿ (s). As is standard in the search literature, we assume this elasticity is
constant with ￿￿￿ < 1.
With ￿0 (s) < 0 a ￿rm entering the set S generates a negative trading externality that
the optimal policy must take into account. There are precedents for such macro externalities
in the literature. For example, in endogenous entry/search models where the terms of trade
are determined by bargaining, there may be too many buyers or sellers relative to the social
optimum depending on the bargaining weight. In these models, deviating from the Friedman
rule may be optimal to improve the extensive margin.12 The restriction that ￿￿￿ < 1 ensures
that this congestion externality is not too large.
2.4 Monetary Policy
We assume a central bank exists that controls the supply of ￿at currency. We denote the
gross growth rate of the money supply as ￿ (￿t), implying Mt (￿t) = ￿ (￿t)Mt￿1 where
Mt (￿t) denotes the quantity of money per household in market 3 in period t: We allow
the gross growth rate, and thus Mt (￿t), to depend on the entire history of the economy.
The central bank implements its policy by providing state contingent lump-sum injections
of money to the households. Let ￿1 (￿t)Mt￿1 and ￿3 (￿t)Mt￿1 denote the state contingent
cash injections in markets 1 and 3 where ￿ (￿t) = 1 + ￿1 (￿t) + ￿3 (￿t).
The precise sequence of action after the shocks are observed is as follows. First, the
monetary injection ￿1 (￿t)M￿1 occurs. Then, households move to the credit market where
non-buyers (  = 0) lend their idle cash and buyers (  = ") borrow money. Buyers and
sellers then move on to market 2 and trade goods. In the third market all ￿nancial claims
are settled and the central bank injects ￿3 (￿t)Mt￿1 units of money per household.
11As argued by Rocheteau and Wright (2005), the probability of trading ￿ (s) has a natural meaning in
matching models with bilateral meetings. It￿ s the probability of having a match. In competitive environments
it still captures search frictions by assuming that although there is a competitive market not all ￿rms get
the chance to trade in this market. It can be derived from the following constant returns to scale matching
function m(b;s) = b￿s1￿￿ with 0 < ￿ < 1, where b is the measure of buyers and s the measure of sellers.




12See Shi (1997), Lagos and Rocheteau (2004), Rocheteau and Wright (2005), Berentsen, Rocheteau and
Wright (2007), and Aruoba, Rocheteau and Waller (2007).
82.5 First-best allocation




































where for each t, the quantities qb
t (j)j2B are the consumption quantities of all households
with e = " (the buyers) and qt (j)j2 ~ S are the production quantities of all ￿rms that pay the
entry cost and are able to enter market 2, while xt (j)j2H[F are the consumption quantities
of all household and all ￿rms in market 3 and yt (j)j2H[F are the production quantities of
all households and all ￿rms in market 3.
An e¢ cient allocation is de￿ned as paths for qb
t (j)j2B, qt (j)j2 ~ S, xt (j)j2H[F, yt (j)j2H[F,










that is independent of history and satis￿es ￿0 [x￿ (!)] = 1, qb￿ (!) = ￿ [s￿ (!)]s￿ (!)q￿ (!),







0 [q (!)] (4)
￿ = ￿ [s(!)](1 + ￿
￿)(1=￿)fc
0 [q (!)]q (!) ￿ c[q (!)]g (5)
where q (!) is a seller￿ s production and qb (!) a buyer￿ s consumption in market 2, and x(!)
is consumption in market 3. Note that x￿ (!) is not history dependent ￿it only depends on
the current realization of the aggregate state. The planner faces no intertemporal trade-o⁄s
and so he simply chooses the quantities that maximize welfare state by state for all t. This
implies that the history of the shock process is irrelevant for the e¢ cient allocation.
We also show in the Appendix that the ￿rst-best allocation exists and is unique. Fur-
9thermore, comparative statics on (4)-(5) shows that q￿ (!) is increasing in all of the shocks,
while s￿ (!) is increasing in " but is ambiguous in ￿.13
Example 1 To help illustrate how our model works we use a common example throughout





1￿￿, c[q (!)] = q (!)
￿ =￿, ￿ (s) = s￿￿
with ￿ > 1 > ￿ ￿ 0 and the entry cost is ￿ = 1. When ￿ = 0 there is no congestion



















where ￿ ￿ [(￿ ￿ 1 + ￿)￿ + ￿￿]
￿1. From this example, we see that q￿ (!) is increasing in both
shocks. We also have s￿ (!) increasing in " as well as ￿ shocks when ￿ < 1. Thus, the
planner wants entry to be procyclical. Note also that as ￿ ! 1, costs become linear, pro￿ts
go to zero and its optimal to have one seller produce for the entire market since entry is
costly.
Why does the planner want entry to be procyclical? Consider an increase in ". This
implies that households want to consume more and it is optimal to let them consume more.
The planner can achieve this higher level of output by increasing the amount of goods
produced by each seller, i.e., increase q (!), or by having more ￿rms enter and produce,
i.e., increase s(!). With increasing marginal costs of production, the planner chooses to
alleviate higher production costs on each individual ￿rm by having more entry even though
it is costly. Hence, the optimal response to an " shock is to increase both the intensive and
extensive margins for output. A similar argument holds for the other shock.
3 Monetary allocation
Let p3t (￿t) be the time t nominal price of goods in market 3 and thus ￿t (￿t) ￿ 1=p3t (￿t)
is the goods price of money. We study equilibria where end-of-period real money balances
are history invariant
￿t (￿t)Mt (￿t) = ￿t￿1 (￿t￿1)Mt￿1 (￿t￿1); 8 ￿: (6)
13If the productivity shock a⁄ects the entry cost in the same way as the cost function, then s￿ (!) is
increasing in ￿ as well.
10We refer to it as a stationary equilibrium. This implies that in a stationary equilibrium
￿t￿1 (￿t￿1)=￿t (￿t) = ￿ (￿t). In what follows, we look at a representative period t and
work backwards from the third to the ￿rst market to examine the agents￿choices. For
notational ease, variables corresponding to the next period are indexed by +1, and variables
corresponding to the previous period are indexed by ￿1.
3.1 The third market
In the third market households consume x, produce y, and adjust their money balances
taking into account cash payments or receipts from the credit market. If a household has
net borrowing of ‘ units of money, then he repays (1 + i)‘ units of money.
Consider a stationary equilibrium. Let V1(m;￿;t) denote a household￿ s expected lifetime
utility at the beginning of market 1 with m money balances and history ! in period t. Let
V3 (m;￿;t;‘) denote a household￿ s expected lifetime utility from entering market 3 in period
t with m money and ‘ loans with history ￿. For notational simplicity in this section we
suppress the dependence of the value functions on time.
Bellman￿ s equation for a household is
V3 (m;￿;‘) = max
x;y;m+1
f￿ (x) ￿ y + ￿E [V1 (m+1;￿+1)j￿]g (7)
s.t. x + ￿m+1 = y + ￿[m + ￿3 (￿)M￿1] ￿ ￿(1 + i)‘
where m+1 is the money taken into period t + 1 given the history ￿. Rewriting the budget
constraint in terms of y and substituting into (7) yields
V3 (m;￿;‘) = ￿[m + ￿3 (￿)M￿1 ￿ (1 + i)‘]
+max
x;m+1
f￿ (x) ￿ x ￿ ￿m+1 + ￿E [V1 (m+1;￿+1)j￿]g:
The ￿rst-order conditions are ￿0 (x￿) = 1, meaning x￿ is constant and
￿￿ + ￿E [V
m
1 (m+1;￿+1)j￿] = 0 (8)
where the superscript denotes the partial derivative with respect to the argument m. Thus,
V m
1 is the marginal value of taking an additional unit of money into the ￿rst market in period
t+1. Since the choice of m+1 is independent of m, all households enter the following period
with the same amount of money.
11The envelope conditions are
V
m
3 (m;￿;‘) = ￿; V
‘
3 (m;￿;‘) = ￿￿(1 + i): (9)
As in Lagos and Wright (2005) the value function is linear in wealth.
Let W1 (￿;￿); ￿ 2 f0;1g; denote a seller￿ s expected lifetime utility at the beginning of
market 1 given ￿. If ￿ = 1, the seller has paid the entry cost ￿ and if ￿ = 0 he has not. Note
that we have also taken into account that sellers bring no money into market 1. Since sellers
do not participate in the ￿rst market, we have W1 (￿;￿) = W2 (￿;￿). Let W3 (m;￿) denote
a sellers￿ s expected lifetime utility from entering market 3 with m units of money given ￿.
Bellman￿ s equation for a seller is
W3 (m;￿) = max
x;y f￿ (x) ￿ y + ￿E [W1 (￿+1;￿+1)j￿]g
s.t. x = y + ￿m:
Rewriting the budget constraint in terms of y and substituting into the objective function
yields
W3 (m;￿) = ￿m + max
x f￿ (x) ￿ x + ￿E [W1 (￿+1;￿+1)j￿]g: (10)
The ￿rst-order condition is ￿0 (x￿) = 1. The envelope condition for a seller is
W
0
3 (m;￿) = ￿: (11)
As was the case for households, the value function is linear in m.
3.2 The second market
There are 3 types of agents in the second market: buyers (b), non-buyers (o) and sellers (s).
Let V2 (m;￿;‘;j) denote the value function of a household of type j = b;o. Let qb and q,
respectively, denote the quantities consumed by a buyer and produced by a seller and let p
be the nominal price of goods.
Since non-buyers neither consume or produce, the Bellman equation for this household
is simply V2 (m;￿;‘;o) = V3 (m;￿;‘). The one for a buyer household is

















￿ ￿p; ! 2 ￿; (12)
where ￿q is the multiplier on the buyer￿ s budget constraint. If the budget constraint is
not binding, then "u0 ￿
qb￿
= ￿p. If it is binding, then "u0 ￿
qb￿
> ￿p and the buyer spends
all of his money, i.e. pqb = m. In the ￿rst case, the buyer equates the marginal rate of
substitution between market 2 goods and market 3 goods to the relative price of goods in
the two markets.14 In the latter case, the agent is at a ￿ corner￿ .
The marginal value of a loan is the same for all households and so
V
‘
2 (m;￿;‘;j) = ￿(1 + i)￿; (13)
for j = b;o. Using the envelope theorem and equations (9) and (12), the marginal values of
money for j = b;o are
V
m







2 (m;￿;‘;o) = ￿: (15)
We now describe the entry behavior of the sellers in market 2. The Bellman equation for
a seller who has paid the entry cost is
W2 (1;￿) = ￿ (s)max
q f￿(1=￿)c(q) + W3 (pq;￿)g + [1 ￿ ￿ (s)]W3 (0;￿) (16)
subject to the pricing protocol which we discuss below. The term pq is the money receipts
from selling output.
The Bellman equation for a seller who does not pay the entry cost is W2 (0;￿) = W3 (0;￿).
At the beginning of the period, sellers observe the current state and the representative seller
chooses to enter market 2 with probability ￿ (￿) taking as given the entry choices of other
sellers. Let N denote the measure of potential sellers. Then, since we focus on symmetric
equilibria, he expects a measure s(￿) = ￿(￿)N of sellers entering, where ￿(￿) is the
entering decision of all other sellers. De￿ne
D[￿(￿)N] ￿ W2 (1;￿) ￿ W2 (0;￿) ￿ ￿ (17)
14The MRS between the two markets is "u0 ￿
qb (!)
￿
=￿0 [x(!)]: But from the optimization problem in
market 3, ￿0 [x(!)] = 1 for all !.
13Equation (17) is the expected gain from entering the market. The optimal choice of ￿ satis￿es
￿ (￿) = 1 if D[￿(￿)N] > 0
￿ (￿) = 0 if D[￿(￿)N] < 0
￿ (￿) 2 [0;1] otherwise
We look for symmetric Nash equilibria where all sellers choose the same entry probability
￿ (￿). Moreover, the value(s) of ￿(￿) that sustain a symmetric Nash equilibrium are de￿ned
as follows:
￿(￿) = 1 if D(N) ￿ 0
￿(￿) = 0 if D(0) ￿ 0
D[￿(￿)N] = 0 otherwise
Throughout the paper we focus on equilibria where D[￿(￿)N] = 0 in all states.15 Using
the expressions for W2 (1;￿), W2 (0;￿) and (10) we then obtain the free entry condition
￿ = ￿ (s)[￿pq ￿ (1=￿)c(q)]: (18)
where the RHS is expected pro￿ts. Note that we have suppressed the dependence of s and
q on ! for notational convenience. Since the entry cost has to be paid each period, only
current pro￿ts enters into (18). Free entry requires that expected pro￿ts in market 2 equal
the entry cost. Revenue after history ￿, measured in utility, is given by ￿pq where p is the
nominal price of goods in market 2 and ￿ is the real price of money in the last market, while
costs in utility are ￿(1=￿)c(q). Note that ￿p = p=p3 is the relative price of goods across
markets 2 and 3.
3.3 The credit market
A household who has m money at the opening of the ￿rst market has expected lifetime
utility
E [V1 (m;￿)] =
Z
￿
[V2 (m;￿;‘;b) + V2 (m;￿;‘;o)]dF (!j￿￿1): (19)
Once trading types are realized, a household of type j = b;o solves
max
‘
V2 (m;￿;‘;b) s:t: 0 ￿ m:
15This simply requires that the measure of potential sellers is su¢ ciently large so that in no state all of
them wants to enter. This is a standard assumption in the labor search literature.
14The constraint means that money holdings cannot be negative. The ￿rst-order condition is
V
m
2 (m;￿;‘;b) + V
‘
2 (m;￿;‘;b) + ￿(j) = 0
where ￿(j) is the multiplier on the households￿ s non-negativity constraint. It is obvious
that households with   = " will become borrowers while those with   = 0 become lenders.
Consequently, we have ￿(b) = 0 and ￿(o) > 0.





= ￿p(1 + i) (20)
￿(o) = i￿: (21)















noting that ￿ = f!;￿￿1g: Di⁄erentiating (22) shows that the value function is concave in
m. Use (8) lagged one period to eliminate E [V m
1 (m;￿)j￿￿1] from (22). Then, divide the









We now discuss three pricing protocols: competitive pricing, state contingent monopoly
pricing and non-state contingent monopoly pricing. We refer to this last pricing protocol as
posting. For each pricing protocol, we have
q
b = ￿ (s)sq for all !: (24)
For competitive pricing this is simply the market clearing condition in market 2.
For monopoly pricing this equation also holds because we assume a matching process that
allocates [￿ (s)s]
￿1 buyers to each seller. The bene￿ts of this matching rule are threefold.
First, the ￿rst-best allocation described in Section 3 is replicated if the monopoly pricing
distortion is eliminated. Second, in search-theoretic models of money, bilateral matching
creates monopoly power for both buyers and sellers in the bargaining process. This matching
rule with monopoly pricing eliminates the monopsony power of the buyer and is consistent
15with the pricing frictions in New Keynesian models. Third, the allocation is easily compared
to the ￿ exible price allocation since the only di⁄erence is the pricing mechanism.16
Competitive pricing With price taking, a seller￿ s maximization problem in market 2 is
max
q f￿(1=￿)c(q) + W3 (pq;￿)g





We can then combine (20) and (25) to get an expression for the interest rate




State contingent monopoly pricing With state contingent monopoly pricing, since
seller faces [￿ (s)s]
￿1 buyers, the maximization problem is
max
q;p f￿(1=￿)c(q) + W3 (pq;￿)g
s:t: "u
0 [￿ (s)sq] = p￿(1 + i)






We can then combine (20) and (27) to get an expression for the interest rate
1 + i =
(1 ￿ Ru)"u0 [￿ (s)sq]
(1=￿)c0 (q)
. (28)
Non-state contingent monopoly pricing We now assume that sellers must set the
price before the realization of the current state, !. However, they can use the information
on the history of the aggregate state up to time t ￿ 1, ￿￿1, in forming their expectations
16This assumption is simply made to compare the allocation with monopoly pricing to one with compet-
itive pricing. For this reason, we ignore issues involving 1 < ￿ [s(￿)]s(￿).
17Given our simple approach to generating monopoly power, the gross markup is given by (1 ￿ Ru)
￿1,
which is constant. Since the data suggest the markup is countercyclical, we will clearly be unable to match
this stylized fact. Changing the matching function such that the markup depends negatively on entry, as in
Jaimovich and Floettoto (2007) would be an interesting extension.
16of future pro￿ts. They commit to produce whatever is demanded in state ! at the posted
price, p(￿￿1). However, upon seeing the shock they can choose to enter and try to sell at the
posted price. With this last assumption, no seller will experience negative expected pro￿ts






￿ (￿)￿ [s(￿)]fW3 [p(￿￿1)q (￿);￿] ￿ (1=￿)c[q (￿)]g




0 f￿ [s(￿)]s(￿)q (￿)g = p(￿￿1)￿(￿)[1 + i(￿)] for all !:
where demand in each state satis￿es the buyer￿ s ￿rst-order condition for consumption, i.e.










where we have taken into account that in a symmetric equilibrium ￿ (￿) = s(￿)=N. Equa-
tion (29) then replaces p in (23). We can then combine (20) and (29) to get an expression
for the interest rate











We now derive the optimal stabilization policy in symmetric stationary monetary equilib-
rium. To study this problem we pursue the primal approach to the Ramsey problem where
the central bank chooses the quantities xt, yt, qb
t, qt; st to maximize (3) subject to the free
entry condition (18), the relevant pricing protocol and the resource constraints. In the ap-
pendix we show that these quantities can be implemented with history dependent injections
￿1 (￿) and ￿3 (￿) that satisfy it ￿ 0 and (23). With competitive pricing the pricing protocol
is (25), with state-contingent monopoly pricing it is (27), and with non-state contingent
monopoly pricing it is (29). It should be clear that in all cases xt = x￿ and yt is determined
by the households budget constraint once all of the other quantities are chosen. Finally,
18For this case, we have in mind restaurants who print their menus in advance but upon seeing the state
of the economy can choose to open or not.
17from (24) qb
t is determined once we have qt and st. So the central bank￿ s problem reduces to
choices of qt and st.
Proposition 1 Consider the case of competitive pricing. The constrained optimal allocation
is stationary and depends only on the current state !. With ￿0 [s(!)] = 0, i(!) = 0,
q (!) = q￿ (!) and s(!) = s￿ (!) for all states. With ￿0 [s(!)] < 0, i(!) > 0, q (!) < q￿ (!)
and s(!) > s￿ (!) for all states.
The allocation is stationary and only depends on the current state in both cases despite
the persistence of the shocks. The reason is that the only equation for which the persis-
tence of the shocks matters is the money demand equation (23). Given its optimal choices
fq (!);s(!)g!2￿ the central bank then chooses ￿ (￿) to ensure (23). Thus, any information
content provided by the persistence of the shocks is o⁄set by choosing the stochastic in￿ ation
rate appropriately.
With ￿0 [s(!)] = 0, the Friedman rule replicates the ￿rst-best allocation. This can be
seen by noting that from (20) when i(!) = 0, q (!) = q￿ (!). Moreover, (39) replicates (5) at
q (!) = q￿ (!). The intuition is that with ￿0 [s(!)] = 0 so there is no congestion externality
and the only friction is the cost of holding money across periods. Under the Friedman rule
the agents get compensated for these costs and so agents perfectly self-insure against all
shocks. Consequently, there are no welfare gains from stabilization policies.19 Note that
Proposition 1 also holds in a model where the number of sellers is exogenously given.
With ￿0 [s(!)] < 0 the central bank never chooses i(!) = 0. The reason is the conges-
tion externality. Sellers ignore how their entry lowers the expected pro￿ts of other sellers.
Consequently, in equilibrium there are too many sellers and the aggregate entry cost s(!)￿
is too high relative to the social optimum. To see why a deviation from the Friedman rule is
optimal assume that the central bank sets i(!) = 0, which generates the e¢ cient quantity
q (!) = q￿ (!) in all states. Now consider a reduction in s(!) when i(!) = 0. By mar-
ginally reducing s(!), q (!) is also marginally reduced but the ￿rst-order welfare loss from
doing so is zero. The reduction in q (!) reduces expected pro￿ts for ￿rms and thus entry
declines. This produces a ￿rst-order gain in welfare from reducing s(!)￿. This is achieved
by increasing i(!) above zero.
Although the argument above does not require i(!) > 0 for all states, nevertheless it is
optimal to do so. The reason is that the central bank wants to smooth consumption across
19Ireland (1996) derives a similar result in a model with nominal price stickiness. He ￿nds that at the
Friedman rule there is no gain from stabilizing aggregate demand shocks. For the same reason, Khan, King
and Wolman (2003) ￿nd that with ￿ exible prices the Friedman rule is optimal, although it cannot achieve
the ￿rst-best allocation because of monopolistic distortion in the price setting.
18states. Intuitively, consider two states !;!0 2 ￿ with i(!) = 0 implying q (!) = q￿ (!) and
i(!0) > 0 implying q (!0) < q￿ (!0). Then, the ￿rst-order loss from decreasing q (!) is zero
while there is a ￿rst-order gain from increasing q (!0). This gain can be accomplished by
increasing i(!) and lowering i(!0). Thus, the central bank￿ s optimal policy is to set i(!) > 0
for all states.
We ￿nd this result interesting because it is very reminiscent of the view that the Federal
Reserve kept interest rates ￿too low for too long￿from 2003-2005. In short, this argument
implies the Fed should have raised interest rates to choke o⁄ entry into the housing and
commercial property markets. It is important to note that this argument requires some type
of congestion externality to make entry ine¢ cient. Entry per se is not enough.
Lastly, the central bank￿ s optimal interest rate policy has di(!)=dq (!) being of the same
sign as dRc (!)=dq (!), where Rc is the elasticity of the marginal cost function. Thus,
for a constant elasticity marginal cost function, we have di(!)=dq (!) = 0 and the central
bank perfectly smooths interest rates. The central bank moves the nominal interest rate in
a countercyclical fashion when dRc (!)=dq (!) > 0 and in a pro-cyclical manner when the
opposite is true.





























This example illustrates the basic insight of the model. When entry is endogenous, too much
entry occurs. To reduce entry, the central bank in￿ates in order to drive up nominal interest
rates. This lowers consumption of market 2 goods and lowers pro￿ts for sellers. Expected
lower pro￿ts reduces entry by sellers. Since Rc (!) = ￿ ￿ 1 for these functional forms, the
optimal nominal interest rate is constant across states. Note also that when the entry cost
is constant, i.e. when ￿ = 0, then qc (!) = q￿ (!), sc = s￿ and ic (!) = 0. Again, the central
bank wants entry to be procyclical.
We next consider the case of state-contingent monopoly pricing.
Proposition 2 Consider the case of state contingent monopoly pricing. The constrained
optimal allocation is stationary and depends only on the current state !. With ￿0 (s) = 0,
19i(!) = 0, q (!) < q￿ (!) and s(!) > s￿ (!) for all states. With ￿0 (s) < 0, i(!) > 0,
q (!) < q￿ (!) and s(!) > s￿ (!) for all states.
With monopoly pricing and ￿0 (s) = 0, the Friedman rule is again optimal. However, the
￿rst-best allocation cannot be achieved since the monopoly pricing distortion causes q (!) to
be ine¢ ciently low and s(!) to be ine¢ ciently high in all states
With endogenous entry, once again, due to the entry externality, the central bank pushes
up interest rates to reduce pro￿ts and thus entry. As with competitive pricing, entry is
higher than the social optimum. Also, production is lower than q￿ and qc.










c (!) < q
















Note that when the entry cost is constant ￿ = 0, qsm (!) < q￿ (!), ssm 6= sc = s￿ and
ism (!) = 0. State-contingent monopoly pricing causes market 2 consumption and entry to
be ine¢ cient. Entry can be higher or lower than is socially optimal but it is procyclical.
Finally, we study the case of non-state-contingent monopoly pricing.
Proposition 3 Consider the case of non-state contingent pricing. In this case, central bank
replicates the optimal allocation that occurs under state contingent monopoly pricing.
Why is the central bank able to replicate the posting allocation? Posting simply imposes
a constraint on the behavior of p in market 2. However, the central bank only cares about
the relative price ￿(!)p(!) between market 2 and market 3. As long as that is ￿ exible, the
central bank can replicate the state-contingent monopoly price allocation.
Implementation In the appendix, we derive implementation schemes for each pricing
protocol that supports the desired allocation when ￿0 [s(!)] < 0. The schemes are not
unique since the transfers are nominal injections and the central bank only cares about
the relative transfers across states. For illustration, one transfer scheme under competitive
20pricing is given by





1 + ￿1 (￿) =
f(!j!￿1;￿￿2)
f(!j!L;￿￿2) (1 + ￿1)







and stochastic in￿ ation rate





where ￿￿1 = f!￿1;￿￿2g. The key thing to note is that the in￿ ation rate is state-dependent
and serially correlated. The reason for the serially correlation is as follows. The optimal
allocation associated with state ! does not depend on ￿￿1. However, ￿￿1 contains infor-
mation about the future state ! and this a⁄ects agents￿demand for real balances at time
t ￿ 1, as is shown by (23). In order to o⁄set any informational value history has on current
money demand, the central bank o⁄ers a menu of state-contingent transfers that makes the
real value of money constant regardless of ￿￿1. Note that for general shock processes, the
central bank must promise a sequence of transfers for all possible histories. This seems to
be an unrealistic implementation policy in practice. However, if the shocks are Markovian,
then the central bank￿ s transfers only need to be conditioned on the current and previous
state ￿a much simpler set of transfers to implement.
How does the implementation scheme above work? The injection 1 + ￿1 pins down the
in￿ ation rate in the lowest production state ("L, nL and ￿L). In this state, demand for goods
is at its lowest level and production costs are at their highest value. Then in states where
higher production is desired the central bank alters its injection scheme across markets as
demand for goods increases or costs fall in such a way that it generates changes in real
balances in market 1.
To make this point more concrete, assume the the only shock is the marginal utility shock
" and it is iid. Then the scheme above reduces to










21and stochastic in￿ ation rate
￿ (") = (1 + ￿1)
qb("L)c0[q("L)]
qb(")c0[q(")] :
Under this scheme, the central bank injects the same amount of cash in market 1 regardless
of the size of the " shock. However, qb (!) and q (!) are increasing in ". To engineer higher
consumption and production as " increases, the central bank promises to reduce the market
3 injection and thus the in￿ ation rate of market 3 prices. This means money is more valuable
in market 3 and raises its price, ￿. This induces sellers in market 2 to lower their price of
goods in market 2, thereby increasing real balances in market 2. Hence, by promising to
alter future monetary injections based on today￿ s observed shock, the central bank can alter
the real value of money today.
5 Quantitative Analysis
Since our focus is on optimal policy, we want to know whether our model can replicate the
behavior of the nominal interest rate in the data. Table 1 reports some statistical properties
of GDP, NBI and nominal interest rates during the period 1950-1993. All variables are
reported as percentage deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 1600. NBI
is new business incorporations.20 GDP is real GDP and the nominal interest rate is the
3-Month Treasury Bill Secondary Market Rate.
Table 1: Summary Statistics, 1950:1 to 1993:4.
GDP NBI i
Standard Deviation 0:017 0:058 0:224
Quarterly Autocorrelation 0:816 0:796 0:798
Correlation Matrix GDP 1 0:321 0:473
NBI 1 0:01
i 1
NBI is much more volatile than GDP and has a positive correlation with GDP. The nominal
interest rate is positively correlated with GDP and is more than 10 times more volatile than
20New business incorporations is taken from the Survey of Current Business (November, 1994). The data
series starts in 1948 and was discontinued in 1996.
22GDP and about four times as volatile as NBI. Finally, there is little correlation between the
nominal interest rate and NBI.
It is perhaps surprising that real GDP and the nominal interest rate are positively cor-
related. However, this is what our model suggests if central banks optimally respond to
technology and preference shocks. For example, a positive productivity shock leads to more
entry which the central bank might want to temper by raising the nominal interest rate. As
a consequence, output, entry and the nominal interest rate increase.
5.1 Parameters and targets
We calibrate the model to match US data choosing the model period to be one quarter
with the pricing protocol being state-contingent monopoly pricing. For the calibration, we
need to choose values and functional forms for (i) households preferences f"u(q);￿ (x)g, (ii)
technology f(1=￿)c(q), k (s)g, and (iv) policy i.
For the utility function in the third market we choose ￿ (x) = Aln(x). We set the utility
function for goods traded in the market 2 to belong to the CRRA family
u(q











where ’ ￿ 0. Finally, we assume that the probability of a sale is ￿ (s) = s￿￿ implying
k (s) = ￿=￿ (s) = ￿s
￿:
With these functional forms, we have to identify the parameters (A;￿;￿;’;￿;￿). We
use the following data: average mark-up, ￿ ￿, average money demand, ￿ L, average nominal
interest rate, ￿ {, and the ratio of entry cost to per capita gdp, ￿ ￿. Over the period from
1950-1993, average annual money demand L = M=(PY ) is approximately ￿ L = 0:05, where
M is currency demand M0, and the average nominal interest on the 3-Month Treasury Bill
Secondary Market Rate is ￿ { = 0:05. As pointed out by Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008),
estimates of markups in value added tend be from 1.2 to 1.4, while markups in gross output
lie between 1.05 and 1.15. We set the gross output markup to be ￿ ￿ = 1:1. Djankov et al
(2002) estimates the cost of starting a new business for the US to be ￿ ￿ = 0:017 (as a fraction
of GDP per capita in 1999).
We are missing two targets to pin down, ￿ and A. To ￿ll this gap we simply report the
23results for three values of ￿, namely ￿ ￿ = 0:4, 0:8, and 1:2, and for A = 1:8. The reason
that we only report results for A = 1:8 is that the volatility of the nominal interest rate
is little a⁄ected by A. Table 2 lists the identi￿cation restrictions and the identi￿ed values
of the parameters. In the Appendix we detail the calibration procedure which uses these
restrictions to compute the parameter values listed in Table 2.
Table 2. Calibration and parameter values
Targets ￿ { ￿ L ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A
0:05 0:05 1:1 0:017 0:8 1:8
Parameters ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ A
0:82 4:02 1:61 0:019 0:8 1:8
The choice of ￿ is a⁄ecting the volatility of the nominal interest rate because ￿ represents
the congestion externality where a higher ￿ means more congestion. A change in A a⁄ects
mainly ￿ where an increase in A decreases ￿. The intuition is that the choice of A determines
the relative size of market 2 to market 3. An increase in A, ceteris paribus, makes market
3 larger. To compensate for this increase, ￿ needs to decrease in order to make market 2
larger. Overall, our various experiments with di⁄erent values of A had no quantitatively
important e⁄ects the volatility of the nominal interest rate.
5.2 Model implication for interest rate
To derive the model￿ s prediction for the behavior of the interest rate we need to specify
processes for ￿ and ". To avoid negative values, let ￿ ￿ ea and " ￿ ee. For the non-
stochastic steady state equilibrium we assume that a = e = 0, implying ￿ = 1 and " = 1.
We assume that ￿ and " follow two independent AR(1) processes with persistence parameters
￿￿ (￿") and noise ￿￿;t (￿";t) which are distributed N (0;￿2
￿) [N (0;￿2
")].
We conduct two experiments. First, we assume that the economy is hit by productivity
shocks only. For this purpose, we calibrate the AR(1) process for ￿ such that the model￿ s
real gdp matches the autocorrelation and the standard deviation of real GDP in the data.
This yields the following process for ￿t:21
ln￿t = 0:814748 ￿ ln￿t￿1 + ￿￿;t ￿
2
￿ = 0:0689506 (31)
21The autocorrelation and the standard deviation of the AR(1) process for ￿ depend on the values of ￿
and A. However, the e⁄ects are small and we therefore only report ￿a and ￿￿ for ￿ = 0:8 and A = 1:8.
24Our second experiment is to assume that the economy is hit by demand shocks only.
In this case, we calibrate the AR(1) process for " such that the model￿ s real gdp matches
the autocorrelation and the standard deviation of real GDP in the data. This yields the
following process for "t:22
ln"t = 0:813505 ￿ ln"t￿1 + ￿";t ￿
2
" = 0:00189196: (32)
For each experiment, we then either use (31) or (32) to generate 100,000 observations of
￿ or ", throwing away the ￿rst 10,000 observations. We then use the free entry condition
and the central bank￿ s ￿rst-order conditions to solve for st (￿t;"t) and qt (￿t;"t).23 The series
for st (￿t;"t) is the simulated NBI. We then insert st (￿t;"t) and qt (￿t;"t) into the model￿ s








"t [st (￿t;"t)￿ [st (￿t;"t)]qt (￿t;"t)]
￿￿
(1=￿t)[’ + qt (￿t;"t)]
￿ =(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ 1: (34)
This gives us 90,000 simulated observations of GDP, NBI and i. The standard deviations of
the simulated data is reported in Table 3 for three values of ￿.
Table 3: Results
GDP NBI i
Data 0:017 0:058 0:224
Model ￿ ￿ = 0:4 0:018 0:091 0:476
￿ = 0:8 0:017 0:089 0:519
￿ = 1:2 0:017 0:089 0:565
Model " ￿ = 0:4 0:018 0:09 0:035
￿ = 0:8 0:018 0:09 0:072
￿ = 1:2 0:018 0:09 0:108
The most interesting result of Table 3 is that if productivity shocks were the sole shock,
the model predicts that the nominal interest rate should be much more volatile than it is
in the data ￿about 2.5 times more volatile (for ￿ = 0:8). The opposite is true if demand
22Note also that in order to match the volatility of real GDP the standard deviation of the productivity
shocks is required to be much larger than the one of the demand shock (see (31) or (32)).
23The two equations are found in the Appendix as equations (59) and (60).
25shocks were the only ones hitting the economy ￿the model￿ s nominal interest rate is about
3 times less volatile (for ￿ = 0:8) than in the data. Note that the volatility of the nominal
interest rate is increasing in ￿ since the congestion externality is increasing in ￿ (recall that
at ￿ = 0 there is no congestion externality). Finally, simulated NBI is more volatile than in
the data. All these results are robust to changes in A.
The intuition for the high volatility of the nominal interest rate in response to productivity
shocks and the low volatility in response to demand shocks is as follows. A productivity
shock lowers marginal cost which, holding the number of ￿rms constant, increases expected
pro￿ts. Consequently, more ￿rms attempt to enter market 2. Due to the entry externality,
the central bank raises interest rates to dampen demand which reduces pro￿ts. This tends
to keep aggregate output stable but requires large interest rate movements. In contrast,
holding entry constant, a demand shock increases expected pro￿ts to a lesser extent since
each ￿rm must produce additional output at a higher marginal cost. Since pro￿ts increase
less, entry responds to a lesser extent, and so the central bank does not need to increase the
nominal interest rate as much.24 Consequently, the central bank is much more aggressive in
changing interest rates in response to productivity shocks than to demand shocks.
To check this intuition, we have changed the model so that the productivity shocks
a⁄ect the entry costs too, i.e., entry costs are now counter-cyclical and given by (1=￿t)￿.
This speci￿cation does not change the calibrated parameters of the model since in the non-
stochastic steady state ￿t = 1. With this speci￿cation, when productivity is high, entry costs
are low, which lowers the marginal welfare cost of the entry externality, (1=￿t)￿0 [s(!t)]￿,
for any given value of s(!t). Hence, the central bank is more tolerant of entry and is less
willing to raise interest rates to choke o⁄ pro￿ts and entry. This can be seen in Table 4 by
the much higher volatility of ￿rm entry and the lower volatility of the nominal interest rate
in the row labelled Model ~ ￿ relative to the original speci￿cation labelled Model ￿.25 This
results suggest that entry and the structure of entry costs may be an important source of
volatility in standard Ramsey problems when search frictions are included.
Table 4: Productivity a⁄ects entry cost
24Note also that with demand shocks it is optimal to have more ￿rms to satisfy the higher demand for
goods. In contrast, with productivity shocks, fewer ￿rms are needed to produce a given quantity of output.
25Recall that the volatilities are reported for ￿ = 0:8 and A = 1:8. For ￿ = 0:4 the volatility of the interest
rate drops even below the observed one of 0:224 to 0:198.
26GDP NBI i
Data 0:017 0:058 0:224
Model ￿ 0:017 0:089 0:519
Model ~ ￿ 0:018 0:535 0:425
As a robustness check, we have also calibrated the model to M1 instead of M0. The
basic results are unchanged. The volatility of the nominal interest rate is much larger with
shocks to productivity than with demand shocks. In contrast to our baseline calibration,
the volatility of the interest rate is too low for both productivity and demand shocks. The
interest rate volatility obtained from productivity shocks is roughly one have of the observed
volatility. The one obtained with demand shocks is about 20 times smaller.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have constructed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model where
money is essential for trade and there is endogenous ￿rm entry. The optimal policy involves
having procyclical entry, which matches the stylized facts. If there are congestion external-
ities from entry, then deviating from the Friedman rule is optimal. This result appears to
be consistent with the view that the Fed did not do enough in 2003-2005 to deter excessive
amounts of new construction. In the absence of these externalities, implementing a version
of the Friedman rule is optimal. Our quantitative exercises are enlightening since they sug-
gest that interest rates should have been much more volatile if productivity shocks were the
only source of aggregate uncertainty and much smoother if preference shocks were the main
aggregate shock.
There are many extensions of this model that would be interesting to pursue. For exam-
ple, how would the optimal policy be a⁄ected if repayment of loans were endogenous? In
particular, does the risk of default alter stabilization? Given the events of 2007-2009, the
role of default on stabilization policy appears to be an important issue. Furthermore, we
have assumed that the shocks are known to the central bank. An interesting question is
what is the optimal policy if the central bank has imperfect information about the nature of
the aggregate shocks? How would the existence of inside money a⁄ect the equilibrium and
optimal policy. For example, would inside money act as an automatic stabilizer, eliminating
the need for the central bank to stabilize the economy?
Finally, the state contingent optimal policy of our model requires the central bank observe
the current aggregate state. In reality, the central bank might only have imperfect knowledge
about the state of the economy. It is therefore of interest to investigate whether simple rules
27such as a non-state-contingent interest rate rule can get the economy close to the second
best allocation. In preliminary work, we have calculated the welfare gains from the optimal
stabilization rule relative to two simple rules: a constant interest rate rule and a policy that
yields a constant aggregate output. The welfare loss of following a simple constant interest
rate rule is only about 0.00012% of consumption. In contrast, the welfare loss of a policy
that yields a constant aggregate output is about 0.55% of consumption. We are planning to
explore the welfare implications of optimal stabilization policy in future research.
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t (j)j2B ;qt (j)j2 ~ S ;xt (j)j2H[F ;yt (j)j2H[F
i
and the measures of sellers st for each period. The quantities qb
t (j)j2B are the consumption
quantities of all households with e = " (the buyers) and qt (j)j2 ~ S are the production quantities
of all ￿rms that pay the entry cost and are able to enter market 2, while xt (j)j2H[F are the
consumption quantities of all household and all ￿rms in market 3 and yt (j)j2H[F are the
production quantities of all households and ￿rms in market 3. The planner is constrained
that the allocation has to be feasible. In the second and third markets, respectively, for each















An e¢ cient allocation is de￿ned as paths for qb
t (j)j2B ;qt (j)j2 ~ S ;xt (j)j2H[F ;yt (j)j2H[F, and
st that maximize (3) subject to (35) and(36) and an initial aggregate state !0. One can easily
show that it is optimal to treat all agents of the same type equally. Moreover, using (35) it











which is not state contingent so we can ignore this term in (3). Accordingly, the Lagrangian

















st￿dF (!tj￿t￿1) + ￿t
￿












0 = ￿t ￿ c(qt)=￿t
0 = ￿ (st)(1 + ￿
￿)[c
0 (qt)qt ￿ c(qt)]=￿t ￿ ￿
0 = ￿ (st)stqt ￿ q
b
t
for all t. It is clear from these FOC that the optimal allocation is independent of ￿t￿1 and
stationary for all ! 2 ￿, implying that, for a given state !, xt = x(!), yt = y (!), qb
t = qb (!),
qt = q (!) for all t. Furthermore, an interior solution for st requires ￿￿￿ < 1, which we have
assumed.
De￿ne k [s(!)] ￿ ￿=￿ [s(!)] with k0 (s) > 0. To prove existence and uniqueness of the
￿rst-best allocation, we can rearrange (4)-(5) as follows
"u0 f￿ [s(!)]s(!)q (!)g
c0 [q (!)]=￿
￿ 1 = 0 (37)
k [s(!)] ￿ (1 + ￿
￿)fc
0 [q (!)]q (!) ￿ c[q (!)]g=￿ = 0 (38)
(37) is strictly decreasing function in [s(!);q (!)] space. It approaches in￿nity as s(!)
approaches zero and approaches zero as s(!) goes to in￿nity. If k0 [s(!)] > 0, (38) is strictly
increasing in [s(!);q (!)] space. Morover, at s(!) = 0 there exists a ￿nite q (!) > 0 that
solves
k [s(!)] ￿ (1 + ￿
￿)(1=￿)fc
0 [q (!)]q (!) ￿ c[q (!)]g = 0:
Hence, a unique solution [s￿ (!);q￿ (!)] exists. If ￿ [s(!)] = ￿, (38) is independent of s(!)
implying that for ￿ < +1, a unique solution [s￿ (!);q￿ (!)] exists.
Proof of Propositions 1. The proof involves three steps. We ￿rst derive the solution
to the central bank problem. We then demonstrate that the solution satis￿es i(!t) ￿ 0.
Finally, we show that there exists a transfer scheme ￿1 (￿) and ￿3 (￿) that implements the
central bank allocation for each ￿ and satis￿es (23).
First step. The central bank allocation has to satisfy two constraints. The ￿rst con-
straint is the entry condition (18), which holds in each state. The second constraint is
the pricing equation (25), which also holds in each state. We can use (18) to eliminate
pt (￿t)￿t (￿t) from (25) to get
k (s) = [c
0 (qt)qt ￿ c(qt)]=￿t: (39)
33The central bank then maximizes (3) subject to (39). Using (36) it is straightforward to











which is not state contingent or dependent on monetary policy so we can ignore this term









































































^ ￿t fk (st) ￿ [c
0 (qt)qt ￿ c(qt)]=￿tgdF (!tj￿t￿1)
where ￿t and ^ ￿t ￿ st￿ (st)￿t is the time t Lagrangian multiplier for state !t. Then for all t
















qt ￿ c(qt)=￿t ￿ k (st) ￿ (1 + ￿
￿)
￿1 (1 ￿ ￿t)stk
0 (st) (41)
0 = k (st) ￿ [c
0 (qt)qt ￿ c(qt)]=￿t (42)
0 = q
b
t ￿ ￿ (st)stqt (43)
where (40) and (41) are the ￿rst-order conditions for qt and st respectively. Note that there
are no terms involving past or future values, in (40)-(42) so the allocation is stationary.
Hence, as with the planner, the central bank faces no intertemporal trade-o⁄s and so for
each aggregate state ! we have qt = q (!) and st = s(!). For notational convenience we now
34drop the dependence of q and s on ! with the understanding that they are state dependent.
Use (40) and (42) to write (41) as follows
￿ =
sk0 (s)
Rc (1 + ￿￿)c0 (q)q=￿ + sk0 (s)
(44)





Rc (1 + ￿￿)(1=￿)c0 (q)q + sk0 (s)
(45)
k (s) = [c
0 (q)q ￿ c(q)]=￿: (46)
In (s;q) space, (45) approaches in￿nity as s approaches zero and it approaches zero as s goes
to in￿nity. If k0 (s) > 0, (46) is strictly increasing and q ￿ 0 solves k￿[c0 (q)q ￿ c(q)]=￿ = 0
at s = 0. Hence, a solution (s;q) exists. If k0 (s) = 0, then k (s) = k, (46) is independent
of s implying that for k < +1, a solution (s;q) exists. If (45) is strictly decreasing in (q;s)
space, the equilibrium is unique.
Comparing these two expressions to the ￿rst-best allocation (37)-(38), it is straightfor-
ward to show that q < q￿.




0 (q)q ￿ c(q)]=￿ = 0: (47)
Let qc denote the value of q that solves (47) and let sc ￿ s￿. From (38), it is clear that
qc < q￿. Now let the CB choose q and s. Assume - contrary to the claim in the Proposition
- that the optimal allocation satis￿es s < sc ￿ s￿. Then, from (47), q < qc. It is evident
that the allocation (q;s) has lower welfare than (qc;sc) since q < qc < q￿ and s < sc = s￿.
Thus, in any competitive equilibrium s ￿ s￿.
Second step. From (26) we have 1 + i =
"u0[￿(s)sq]
c0(q)=￿ . Hence, using (45) yields
i =
Rcsk0 (s)
Rc (1 + ￿￿)c0 (q)q=￿ + sk0 (s)
Consequently, if k0 (s) > 0, i > 0 in all states. If k0 (s) = 0, i(!) = 0 in all states. Note
that if sk0 (s)=k (s) = ￿ and qc0 (q)=c(q) = ￿ > 1 are constants, then Rc = ￿ ￿ 1 and the




(1 + ￿￿)￿ + ￿
:
35Third step. We now show that a set of transfers ￿1 (￿) and ￿3 (￿) exists that implement





￿"u0 f￿ [s(!)]s(!)q (!)g
￿ (￿)c0 [q (!)]
￿
dF (!j￿t￿1): (48)










1 + ￿1 (￿) + ￿3 (￿)
dF (!j￿t￿1):
It is clear that any set of transfers ￿1 (￿) and ￿3 (￿) that satis￿es ￿ (￿) = 1+￿1 (￿)+￿3 (￿) =
￿ for all ￿ implements the central bank allocation.
Consider next the case k0 (s) > 0. Assume that the transfers are such that the agents
have just enough money to buy qb (!) = ￿ [s(!)]s(!)q (!) in each state, i.e. p(￿)qb (!) =
M￿1 [1 + ￿1 (￿)]. From the pricing equation (25) we can write this expression as follows
q
b (!)c
0 [q (!)]=￿ = ￿(￿)M￿1 [1 + ￿1 (￿)]. (49)
Let z ￿ ￿(￿)M (￿) = ￿(￿)M￿1 [1 + ￿1 (￿) + ￿3 (￿)]. Using (49) we get
z = q
b (!)c
0 [q (!)]=￿ + ￿(￿)M￿1￿3 (￿): (50)
We have one degree of freedom for the choice of ￿3 (￿). Assume the central bank conditions
the transfers on the t and t￿1 shocks for any ￿￿2. We then have ￿3 (￿) = ￿3 (!;!￿1;￿￿2).
Consider the state !L = (￿L;"L) and set ￿3 (!L;!L;￿￿2) = 0. This pins down the real stock
of money z = qb (!L)c0 [q (!L)]=￿L. This implies ￿ (!L;!L;￿￿2) = 1 + ￿1 (!L;!L;￿￿2)
which remains to be determined. Return to this later. Now, using the value of z in (50) for
!￿1 = !L yields





which gives us the realized money growth rate
￿ (!;!L;￿￿2) = [1 + ￿1 (!;!L;￿￿2)]
qb(!L)c0[q(!L)]=￿L
qb(!)c0[q(!)]=￿








36This equation imposes a restriction on the choice of the vector f￿1 (!;!L)g!2￿ : One such





qb(!L)c0[q(!L)]=￿Lf (!j!L;￿￿2)d! ￿ 1
Now consider an arbitrary !￿1: Again we obtain





which gives us the following
￿ (!;!￿1;￿￿2) = [1 + ￿1 (!;!￿1;￿￿2)]
qb(!L)c0[q(!L)]=￿L
qb(!)c0[q(!)]=￿










Thus, for both (51) and (52) to hold as it does for !L we must have
1 + ￿1 (!;!￿1;￿￿2) =
f (!j!￿1;￿￿2)
f (!j!L;￿￿2)
[1 + ￿1 (!;!L;￿￿2)] 8!;!￿1
This pins down every transfer as a function of ￿1 (!;!L;￿￿2). Thus, for ￿1 (!;!L;￿￿2) = ￿1
we have the transfer scheme











and stochastic in￿ ation rate










f(!j!L;￿￿2) p(￿) = M￿1
(1+￿1)f(!j!￿1;￿￿2)
qb(!)f(!j!L;￿￿2) :
Proof of Propositions 2. The proof follows along the lines of the proof of Proposition 1.
37First step. The central bank allocation has to satisfy two constraints. The ￿rst con-
straint is the entry condition (18), which holds in each state. The second constraint is the










Notice the appearance of the markup (1 ￿ Ru)
￿1, which is absent from (39).







￿ 1 ￿ ￿t
Rc + Ru











0 = k (st) ￿
￿
c







t ￿ st￿ (st)qt (57)
Note that for Ru = 0 (54) - (56) and (40)-(42) are identical. Again, because there are no
terms involving past or future values, the solution to (54)-(56) is independent of t and ￿ so
it is therefore stationary. Use (54) and (56) to write (55) as follows
￿ =
Ru (1 + ￿￿)c0 (qt)qt=￿t + (1 ￿ Ru)stk0 (st)
(Rc + Ru)(1 + ￿￿)c0 (qt)qt=￿t + (1 ￿ Ru)stk0 (st)
: (58)



















=￿ = 0: (60)
Comparing these two expressions to the ￿rst-best allocation (37)-(38), it is straightforward
to show that q < q￿. To establish that s ￿ s￿ we can replicate the same proof as in the case
of competitive pricing above.
Second step. Since (41) and (55) are identical and ￿ < 1, we can replicate the proof of
step 2 of Proposition 2 one for one.
Third step. We now show that a set of transfers ￿1 (￿) and ￿3 (￿) exists that implement
the CB allocation and satisfy (23). Using (24) and (27), we can write (23) as follows:




"u0 f￿ [s(!)]s(!)q (!)g






38We ￿rst consider the case k0 (s) = 0. Since (1 ￿ Ru)"u0 f￿ [s(!)]s(!)q (!)g = (1=￿)c0 [q (!)]










1 + ￿1 (￿) + ￿3 (￿)
dF (!tj￿t￿1):
It is clear that any set of transfers ￿1 (￿) and ￿3 (￿) that satis￿es ￿ (￿) = 1+￿1 (￿)+￿3 (￿) =
￿ for all ! = ￿ implements the central bank allocation.
Consider next the case k0 (s) > 0. Assume that the transfers are such that the agents
have just enough money to buy qb (!) in each state, i.e. p(￿)qb (!) = M￿1 [1 + ￿1 (￿)].





0 [q (!)]=￿ = ￿(￿)M￿1 [1 + ￿1 (￿)]. (62)
Since z = ￿(￿)M￿1 [1 + ￿1 (￿) + ￿3 (￿)], using (49) we get (50). As before, assume the
central bank mainly conditions the money growth rate on the shocks at t and t￿1: Consider
the state !L = (￿L;"L) and set ￿3 (!L;!L) = 0. Thus, z = (1 ￿ Ru)
￿1 qb (!L)c0 [q (!L)]=￿L





0 [q (!L)]=￿L = ￿(￿)M￿1 [1 + ￿1 (￿) + ￿3 (￿)]:
Using this expression and (62) we can obtain ￿3 (!;!L) as a function of ￿1 (!;!L)






The realized money growth satis￿es
￿ (!;!L;￿￿2) = [1 + ￿1 (!;!L;￿￿2)]
qb(!L)c0[q(!L)]=￿L
qb(!)c0[q(!)]=￿ (64)
Then, replace ￿ (!;!L;￿￿2) in (48) to get








This equation imposes a restriction on the vector f￿1 (!;!L;￿￿2)g!2￿. However, there are
many choices that are consistent with this equation. One particular choice is ￿1 (!;!L;￿￿2) =
39￿1. In which case we have the transfer scheme





qb(!L)c0[q(!L)]=￿Lf (!j!L;￿￿2)d! ￿ 1;






Now pick an arbitrary state !￿1. Once again we obtain





￿ (!;!￿1;￿￿2) = [1 + ￿1 (!;!￿1;￿￿2)]
qb(!L)c0[q(!L)]=￿L
qb(!)c0[q(!)]=￿
and the money demand equation








Again for the money demand equations (65) and (66) to hold we must have
1 + ￿1 (!;!￿1;￿￿2) = (1 + ￿1)
f (!j!￿1;￿￿2)
f (!j!L;￿￿2)
which implies the in￿ ation rate is given by





and the price of money and the price of goods are stochastic and satisfy
￿(￿) =
f(!j!L;￿￿2)qb(!)c0[q(!)]=￿
f(!j!￿1;￿￿2)(1￿Ru)M￿1(1+￿1); p(￿) = M￿1
(1+￿1)f(!j!￿1;￿￿2)
qb(!)f(!j!L;￿￿2) :
Proof of 3. In this proof we show that it is optimal and feasible to implement the same
allocation as for state-contingent monopoly pricing. The central bank allocation has to
satisfy the entry condition (18) and the pricing equation (29). Let ^ ￿(￿t) ￿ ￿(￿t)p(￿t￿1);
which is the relative price between market 2 and market 3 goods. Since at time t, p(￿t￿1) is
a predetermined variable, the central bank can a⁄ect this relative price by changing ￿(￿t)









dF (!tj￿t￿1) = 0:






































































where ^ ￿t = ￿t￿ (st)st is the Lagrange multiplier for (18) and ￿t is the one for (29). Since we
know stqt = ntqb
t in equilibrium we can eliminate qb
t and simply choose qt, st and ^ ￿t for all t.
The optimal allocation then solves
The ￿rst-order conditions for qt, st and ^ ￿t reduce to
0 = "tu
0 [(￿ (st)stqt)] ￿ c














0 [(￿ (st)stqt)]qt ￿ c
0 (qt)=￿t ￿ k (st) ￿ stk
0 (st)(1 ￿ ￿t) (68)
0 = k (st) ￿ ^ ￿tqt + c(qt)=￿t: (69)
If the central bank enacts a policy such that the relative price is given by
^ ￿(￿) ￿ ￿(￿)p(￿￿1) =
c0 [q (!)]=￿
1 ￿ Ru (70)
then (67) - (69) reduce to (54) - (56). Furthermore, this choice also satis￿es the pricing
equation (29). Consequently, the central bank chooses the same allocation as with state-
contingent monopoly pricing.
Implementation: The central bank wants to replicate the state-contingent monopoly
pricing allocation. Hence, the optimal quantities come from the solution to that problem.
All that remains to be determined is how to implement it with non-state contingent pricing.
Consider the case k0 (s) > 0. Assume that the transfers are such that the agents have just
enough money to buy q (!) in each state. This implies the aggregate money stock must
purchase total nominal output in market 2, i.e. M￿1 [1 + ￿1 (￿)] = p(￿￿1)qb (!). From (70)
41we have




0 [q (!)]=￿. (71)
We also have z = ￿(￿)M￿1 [1 + ￿1 (￿) + ￿3 (￿)]. Using (71) we get




0 [q (!)]=￿ + ￿3 (￿)￿(￿)M￿1: (72)
As before, assume the central bank only conditions the money growth rate on the last two
shocks for any ￿￿2. Denote ￿(￿) = ￿(!;!￿1;￿￿2). Consider the state !L = (￿L;"L) and
set ￿3 (!L;!L) = 0. Thus from (72) we have





This pins down the real stock of money. It then follows from the buyer￿ s budget constraint
that
1 + ￿1 (!;!L;￿￿2) = [1 + ￿1 (!L;!L;￿￿2)]
qb (!)
qb (!L)
In short, with p(￿￿1) ￿xed, nominal spending has to rise as qb (!) increases, meaning the
nominal injection in market 1 must also rise regardless of what happens in market 3. We can
then solve for ￿3 (!;!L) as before to obtain (63). Using the expression above in (63) yields












Using this expression and (70) in (23) we obtain








This places a restriction on ￿1 (!L;!L;￿￿2) given by





c0[q(!L)]=￿Lf (!j!L;￿￿2)d! ￿ 1:
This gives us all of the transfers for !￿1 = !L:
42Now consider any state !￿1. We get





￿ (!;!￿1;￿￿2) = [1 + ￿1 (!;!￿1;￿￿2)]
qb(!L)c0[q(!L)]=￿L
qb(!)c0[q(!)]=￿ :
Then from (70) in (23) we get








In order for (73) and (74) to hold we must have
[1 + ￿1 (!;!￿1;￿￿2)] = [1 + ￿1 (!L;!L;￿￿2)]
qb(!)f(!j!￿1;￿￿2)
qb(!L)f(!j!L;￿￿2)
This pins down ￿1 (!;!￿1) as a function of ￿1 (!L;!L) for all !￿1: Thus the implementation
scheme





c0[q(!L)]=￿Lf (!j!L;￿￿2)d! ￿ 1
￿1 (!;!￿1;￿￿2) = [1 + ￿1 (!L;!L;￿￿2)]
qb(!)f(!j!￿1;￿￿2)
qb(!L)f(!j!L;￿￿2) ￿ 1









and the subsequent in￿ ation rates




￿ (￿) = ￿ (!;!L;￿￿2)
f (!j!￿1;￿￿2)
f (!j!L;￿￿2)
allow the CB to implement the state-contingent monopoly pricing allocation even though
there is price posting. We can then solve for the equilibrium prices
￿(￿) =
qb(!)c0[q(!)]=￿
M￿1[1+￿1(!;!￿1;￿￿2)](1￿Ru) p(￿￿1) = M￿1
[1+￿1(!L;!L;￿￿2)]f(!j!￿1;￿￿2)
qb(!L)f(!j!L;￿￿2) :
Calibration procedure Here we show how we calibrate the parameters (A;￿;￿;’;￿;￿).
We can calibrate ￿ directly from the mark-up target ￿ ￿ and the money demand target ￿ L as




where ￿j is the mark-up in market j, p2y2 is the nominal output in market 2 and p3y3 is
nominal output in market 3. The mark-up in market 3 is ￿3 = 0, and in market 2 it is
￿2 = (p2=p3)=[(1=￿)c0 (q)]. Then, ￿2 = 1=(1 ￿ ￿) since the seller￿ s ￿rst-order condition is






Note that in market 2 in each quarter the total stock of money is spent which implies that
M = p2y2. Then, since the model￿ s money demand satis￿es L = M=[4(p2y2 + p3y3)] =
p2y2=[4(p2y2 + p3y3)] we have




where we have replaced the model￿ s money demand L with our money demand target ￿ L and
￿ with ￿ ￿. So far we have determined the parameter ￿ from (75). We next show how we
pin down the remaining parameters (A;￿;’;￿;￿). We ￿rst derive an expression for money
demand L. Nominal quarterly output in market 2 can be written as
p2y2 = p2s￿ (s)q = p3(1=￿)c
0 (q)s￿ (s)q=(1 ￿ ￿):
Nominal quarterly output in market 3 is p3 ^ A where ^ A = (2 + })A since the measure of
buyers is normalized to 2, the measure of ￿rms is }, and both consume x￿ = A. Without
loss in generality, we can pick any } > s. A di⁄erent value of } only changes A. In what





output p2y2 + p3y3 per quarter measured in units of market 3 goods is
(1=￿)c
0 (q)s￿ (s)q=(1 ￿ ￿) + ^ A:
Finally, by setting the model￿ s money demand equal to the money demand target we get
￿ L =
(1=￿)s￿ (s)qc0 (q)=(1 ￿ ￿)
4
h
s￿ (s)q(1=￿)c0 (q)=(1 ￿ ￿) + ^ A
i: (76)
We next derive an expression for the cost of starting a new business as a fraction of per
44capita GDP. Since the measure of households is 2, the model￿ s cost of starting a new business
as a fraction of per capita GDP is 2￿=
h





s￿ (s)q(1=￿)c0 (q)=(1 ￿ ￿) + ^ A
(77)











and the buyer￿ s ￿rst-order condition
(1 ￿ ￿)"u0 [(s=n)q]
(1=￿)c0 (q)
= 1 +￿ {: (79)
(78) and (79) can be simultaneously solved to yield the functions ^ q = q (￿;’;￿;￿) and
^ s = s(￿;’;￿;￿). Substituting ^ q and ^ s into the maximization problem of the central bank
yields
"u0[(^ s=n)^ q]
(1=￿)c0(^ q) ￿ 1 =
(Rc+￿)[(1=￿)c0(^ q)^ q￿+(1￿￿)^ sk0(^ s)]
(1￿￿)[(1=￿)c0(^ q)^ q(Rc+￿)+(1￿￿)^ sk0(^ s)]; (80)
into (76) yields
￿ L =
(1=￿)^ s￿ (^ s) ^ qc0 (^ q)
4
h
^ s￿ (^ s) ^ q(1=￿)c0 (^ q) + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ A
i; (81)
and into (77) yields
￿ ￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿)2￿
^ s￿ (^ s) ^ q(1=￿)c0 (^ q) + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ A
(82)


































to simulate the model. The Mathematica ￿les for the calibration available by request.
26Note the following. First, 4
h
(1=￿)c0 (q)s￿ (s)q=(1 ￿ ￿) + ^ A
i
is annual GDP. The measure of households
is normalized to 1 so 4
h
(1=￿)c0 (q)s￿ (s)q=(1 ￿ ￿) + ^ A
i
is also per capita GDP. Second, the cost of a new
business ￿ has to be paid each quarter. Hence, the annual cost of operating a new business is 4 ￿ ￿ which
explains why the numerator is (1=￿)c0 (q)s￿ (s)q=(1 ￿ ￿) + ^ A.
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